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SUMMARY 
It is likely that nuclear diffusion will prove destabilizing 
if for no other reason than that it will present us with a novel 
world , and one substantially less secure than the present world . 
The acquisition of nuclear weapons may be expected to have a 
sobering effect upon nations , but any increase of prudence may be 
more than offset by the insecurity many nations will experience . 
The impacr of the Nth country problem on stability will 
depend largely upon the nature and quality of the weapons systems 
Nth countries acquire . I n relation to the maj-or powers , Nth 
countries possessing a weapons system entirely vulnerable to a 
pre -emptive strike, or incapable of penetrating the active 
defenses of a major power , would probably not enjoy a greater 
degree of strategic independence and security than they do today . 
An Nth country might become substantially more independent, how-
ever , if it were to possess a weapons system some small portion 
of w~1ich could survive a pre - emptive strike and penetrate the 
defenses even of a major adversar y . 
It seems reasonably clear that the trigger value of nuclear 
weapons will depend on the size of the trigger . Below a certain 
size the trigger may well prove to be a liability rather than an 
asset . Above a certain size and quality , the trigger may turn 
into an asset of considerable significance . 
Again, in relation to maj or powers , it is difficult to see 
the advantage an Nth power would obtain by acquiring tactical 
nuclear weapons , since in all probability the employment of such 
weapons would be restricted to the territory of the Nth country . 
iv 
Nuclear diffusion is very likely to increase the incidence 
of local conflicts between Nth countries . The only reasonable 
assumption, it would app0ar, is that the possibility of major 
power involve·nent in such conflicts will remain about the same 
as Jt present . Considered in isolation, therefore, nuclear dif-
fusion will have a strategically destabilizing effect since the 
consequences of military instability at lower levels must 




Although there is a general consensus among the exocrt:s that 
nuclear diffusion must prove destabilizing , there is consiJcraLle 
variation of opinion on how destabilizing nuclear ditfusio, might 
beo To a large extent , this va~iation of opinion may be attribu-
ted to the very different assumptions analysts have made --oiten 
unconsciously--on such critical matters as: the military en\;iron -
ment in which nuclear diffusion might take place; the extent o( 
nuclear diffusion as well as the speed and the evenness with 
which it occurs; the size and quality of the weapons systems 
eventually possessed by the smaller powers; and so on. 
It will be readily apparent that it makes a great Jeal of 
difference whether nuclear diffusion occurs within a highly 
unstable military envirorunent or whether it occurs within an 
environment characterized by a very stable strat:egic relation-
ship between the major nuclear powerso Similarly, the number of 
countries obtaining nuclear weapons, the traditions and interests 
of such countries , and the speed with which countries obtain 
nuclear weapons could all be factors of critical importancco A 
world of ten nuclear countries may pose new and difficult proL -
lems, but these problems may be very different from the problems 
posed by a world of thirty nuclear nations . Nor would the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by Sweden necessarily have 
the same consequences for stability as would the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons by Egypt . And, if nations were to acquire 
l 
nuclear weapons over a fairly extended period of time, a 
measure of adjustment might be made that would prove impossible 
if the time period for nuclear diffusion is telescoped . 
Even more significant , perhaps, is the assumption one makes 
about the nature of the weapons systems the smaller nations might 
eventually possess (let us say within the next 10 to 20 years). 
It is one thing to assume that the smaller nations would possess 
only a very small number of low-yield weapons , together with a 
delivery system limited to manned aircraft . It is quite another 
matter to assume that nuclear and missile technology has so 
advanced as to enable many of the small nations to acquire a 
substantial number of high -yield weapons and a missile-delivery 
system. Of course, all kinds of possibilities between these 
two extremes may also be envisagedo 
These observations should not be taken to imply that it is 
pointless to discuss the possible effects of nuclear diffusion 
from a rather general point of view and without making a large 
number of fairly specific assumptions . The attempt to evaluate 
the consequences of nuclear diffusion in terms of the variety of 
circumstances in which it might conceivably occur is, at any 
rate, hardly feasible since it resembles a game of almost limit-
less possibilities . Besides, many of the consequences expected 
to follow from diffusion may not unreasonably be considered as 
applying in varying degree to rather disparate circumstances. 
At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize that these con-
sequences will apply in varying degree depending upon the more 
specific conditions one assumes and that the degree to which 
they are applicable must prove of critical importance to the 
policy-maker . 
In the following discussion, the principal arguments that 
have been put forward on the expected consequences of nuclear 
dif f usion are examined in terms of what this writer regards as 
the more likely developments that might attend the process of 
diffusiono No attempt is made to consider these arguments by 
testing them in terms of a large number of possible circumstances. 
Nor is the attempt made to portray a particular situation, 
characterized by a number of rather specific features, and 
then to consider the consequences of diffusion within the 
prescribed framework. Obviously, the method that is pursued 
2 
reflects a measure of bias, since it is consciously selecti ve . 
Even so, some of the assumptions that are made should raise 
little controversy . l 
lo It should be emphasized that this paper is not addressed 
to the problems arising from "nuclear sharing . TT Presumably, 
nuclear sharing indicates a policy whereby a major nuclear power 
ngivesTT nuclear weapons to an ally while retaining a veto right 
over the use of the weapons . In other words, it Ttshares TT control 
over the weapons with the recipient nation in the sense that both 
giver and recipient must agree on the e~ployment of the weapons 
before they can be used . There is a clear and decisive differ-
ence, then, between shared nuclear forces and independently con-
trolled nuclear forces . It is equally clear that the consequences 




THE ROLE OF NOVEL'IY, PRUDENCE, AND NUMBERS 
NOVELTY AS A DESTABI LI ZI NG FACTOR 
Among the general arguments stressing the destabilizing 
effects of nuclear diffusion per haps the most significant argu -
ment emphasizes novelty as a destabilizing factor . In its 
simplest form , it is the argument that novelty implies uncer -
tainty and , in consequence , instability . Thornton Read makes 
this point as follows : 
1 
••• a world made up of nuclear power s would be more 
unfamiliar than our pre0ent wor ld ( which is unfamil -
iar enough ), more complex in its power relations , 
and hence more difficult to understand and deal with . 
Our ability to handle m.'w situations is limited at 
best . The more unfamiliar the situation , the greater 
is the probability of serious failure . It has taken 
years to gain what understanding we now have of 
deterrence and stability in a bipolar nuclear world . 
A world of many nuclear powers would present much 
more complex probl2ms . n2 
2 . Thornton Read , A Proposal to Neutralize Nuclear Weapons , 
Princeton Center of International Studies , Policy Memorandum 
Noo 22, 1960 , p . 53 . Herman Kahn makes much the same point : nThe 
1 two - power 1 case seems both intellectually and practically more 
4 
It is difficult to deny the force of this argument, 
general though it may be . To be sure , one may point to 
novel developments that have not had a particularly destabi -
lizing effect on state relations . But on the whole, the 
weight of experience seems clearly to point in the opposite 
dir ection . And a world of many nuclear powers would be a 
nover world , even as contrasted with the present world . I f 
stability depends upon our ability to understand u.nd to con -
trol a given situation , it is only reasonable to conclude 
t hat a complex and as yet obscure situation will be less 
amenable to controlo 
There is , in addition , the argument that nuclear diffusion 
will lead to an ever increasing obsession with nuclear weapons , 
a development that must prove destabilizing because of the 
greater insecurity it is eventually bound to create . TI1e spread 
of nuclear weapons , this argument contends , is all too likely to 
prove hyperbolic in character . With every increase in the nwn10r 
of nuclear powers , the pressure on non - nuclear nations to u.cquirc 
nuclear weapons will increase . In large measure, this pressure 
will simply reflect considerations of prestige and the sense of 
"inferiority' attached to nonmembership in a club that has come 
to include many of the middle range and some of the srnc:i.ller 
powers . The possession of nuclear weapons will therefore come to 
represent an increasingly important status symbol f or a large 
number of the nations of the world . In part, however, this pres -
sure will also reflect strategic considerations . In this res pect , 
Paul Doty writes that "if a country can gain a nuclear capc:i.bility 
that is significant in terms of the potential threat it faces , it 
can be strategically justified in doing s o . 1 3 This threat need 
controllable than the 'N - power 1 case . The diffusion of nuclear 
weapons not only complicates the over -all 'analytic ' problem , but 
the stakes at risk if events go badly would seem to be less in the 
1 two- power 1 than in the 1 N- power 1 case . " 'The Arms Race and Some 
of its Hazards , 11 Daedalus ( Fall , 1960 ), p . 778 . 
3 . Paul Doty , TTThe Role of the Smaller Powers , " Daedalus 
(Fall , 1960 ), p . 823 . Doty adds : " .-owhile most of the smaller 
powers do not have strategically valid reasons to justify nuclear 
arming , the decision to do so by any of a number of individual 
nations could trigger others into f ollowing suit , since the threat 
pr esented by a nation with a few newly acquired nuclear arms is a 
challenge they could dare to meet . " 
5 
not emanate from a maj or nuclear power but from one of the 
smaller nuclear powers . Indeed , it is the possible threat 
presented by a neighbor with a few newly acquired nuclear 
weapons, and with whom one has a serious conflict of 
interests, that may seem the more clearly to provide a stra-
tegic justification for acquiring nuclear weapons . 
Whatever the particular complex of reasons, however, the 
increasingly widespread possession of nucleur weapons will have 
the general effect of aggravating the security problem nations 
face . 4 For the spread of nuclear weapons will aJmost inevitably 
result in an ever greater dependence upon these weapons and a 
decreasing dependence and emphasis on conventional weapons. If 
diffusion occurs largely by the independent efforts of the indi-
vidual nations , unassisted by the major nuclear powers, it will 
have to come through the diversion of resources now devoted to 
conventional forces . Nations will probably be reluctant to sup-
port both types of forces and many of them simply cannot afford 
to make the effort required to develop nuclear forces while 
retaining adequate conventional forceso Besides, it is only to 
be expected that the reaction to the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons will be to place an exaggerated reliance upon these 
weapons --at least for purely regional rivalries and conflicts--and 
to de - emphasize the utility of conventional forces . Thus, even i f 
the major nuclear powers were to transfer (not rt share") nuclear 
weapons and delivery systems to their allies, the latter might 
still be unwilling to continue to bear the burden of maintaining 
adequate conventional forces . 
The world will therefore move ever closer to a situation in 
which the present confrontation of the two major nuclear powers 
will be re - enacted on a more modest level between a number of 
the smaller powers . Given an uneven spread of nuclear weapons--
much the more likely development- - the temptation to resort to 
preventive war against an adversary not yet in possession of 
nuclear weapons is bound to arise . Given a fairly even spread of 
nuclear weapons , though weapons whose vulnerability make them lit-
tle more than first - strike forces, the temptation to remove an 
4 . This statement, it should be noted , is not incompatible 
with the possibility that a particular state may improve--at 
least for a time- - its security by acquiring nuclear weapons . It 
is the international system as a whole that the statement refers 
to . 
6 
adversary through surprise attack may prove very greato And, 
what may begin as a symmetrical spread of nuclear weapons may 
nevertheless develop asymmetrical features . There is no reason 
to believe that the fears that have haunted and that still haunt 
the major nuclear powers will not prove equally oppressive to the 
smaller countries in their relations with one another. If these 
expectations are reasonable, the over -all consequence of nuclear 
diffusion must be an ever greater insecurity productive of an 
ever greater instability . Finally, and for reasons examined 
below, the insecurity and instability that may breed nuclear con-
flicts a~ong the smaller powers will also hold out the prospect 
of involving the major powers as well . 
THE RELATION OF POWER TO PRUDENCE 
It is of course apparent that the argument summarized above 
draws its persuasive power from a number of assumptions that deserve 
a morG careful scrutiny and that, in any event, cannot be regarded 
as self -evident . Even so, none of the assumptions on which it 
depends seems unreasonable. Occasionally, it has been pointed out 
that this general argument neglects the possibility that the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons will be a sobering experience for 
the smaller powers and will have the effect of making these 
nations more prudent . But this objection largely misses the real 
point of the argument . Even if it is assumed that the acquisi-
tion of nuclear weapons will have a sobering effect upon the pos-
sessors, the relevant question is not whether nations may become 
so;newl1at more prudent but whether they will resist the compulsions 
or the nnecessity" under which they may come to believe they must 
act . Given the all too possible circumstances that may character-
ize the relations of a number of smaller powers during a period 
of nuclear diffusion, it may seem very imprudent--from the point 
of view of the interests of a smaller power5--not to use nuclear 
weapons . 
Besides, although the acquisition of nuclear weapons may 
have the general effect of making nations more prudent, it must 
So And in this respect, it is difficult to consider the pru-
dential qJality of the actions of a smaller nation save from the 
point of view of the interests of that nation--not the interests 
of an alliance and even less the interests of international 
society as a whole . 
7 
be admitted that we have very little experience to go on in this 
respecto What experience we do have is limited to the major 
powers and is by no means unambiguous . Whether this experience--
itself not free from ambiguity - -would be repeated by the smaller 
powers in terms of their immediate rivalries is at the very least 
open to serious doubt . And the temptations nuclear weapons may 
hold out to some of the smaller nations to nresolven a conflict 
with a neighbor not yet in possession of these weapons may· still 
overcome whatever increase in prudence that otherwise results 
from the possession of nuclear weapons . 
For the most part , however, the question of prudence or--as 
some writers prefer to put the matter--of nresponsibilityn has 
been used as a further argument on behalf of the position that 
nuclear diffusion must prove destabilizing . This argument has 
taken a number of forms . Perhaps the most common form, and cer-
tainly the simplest, is the assertion that by definition the 
great powers are also the great nresponsiblesn and the smaller 
powers are somehow less responsible . Responsibility is there -
fore held to be by some mysterious process directly proportional 
to po·v>Jer . 6 A more nsophisticated n version of this argument 
declares that the great powers --meaning of course the present 
great nuclear powers7- -are the more responsible because they have 
the most to lose if nuclear weapons are used . Smaller nations , 
unhampered by the burdens shouldered by the great nuclear powers, 
may--and probably would--be tempted to employ nuclear weapons 
under trivial provocation . Finally , there is the rather novel 
suggestion that the more technologically advanced and complex a 
society, the more likely is it to have a leadership that is 
rational and, we may assume, responsible in issues of war and 
peace which involve perhaps the nation 1 s very existence . 
60 Prejudices change . I n the interwar period almost the 
reverse belief was taken as self - evident by the majority of 
writers . Small powers were not only the more virtuous but also 
the more responsible . Purely as a personal choice , I still find 
the earlier belief pre f erable . At least it had the merit of 
refusing to equate power with responsibility ( and by implication 
with virtue as well ). 
7 . This in order to exclude China from the category of the 
ngreat responsibles . u 
8 
There is no reason, however, to assume that prudence or 
responsibility is somehow directly proportional to power. The 
great powers--specifically the present great nuclear powers--are 
not by definition more responsible than the smaller powers. Nor 
are the great powers the more responsible because they have more 
to lose through a nuclear conflict which may eventually engulf 
them~ At any rate, the question who has the most to lose cannot 
be meaningfully answered in quantitative terms. If it is to prove 
relevant at all, it must be asked and answered in qualitative 
terms. In this sense, the smaller powers surely have as much to 
lose as the major powers; i.e., their national existence. On this 
issue they may be expected--as a general rule--to be as prudent 
and therefore as responsible as the major nuclear powers. It is, 
of course, quite true that prudence and responsibility with re-
spect to the new weaponry depends, at least in large part, upon a 
sophistication that can come only from a knowledge of and an 
experience with these weapons. No one would view with equanimity 
the sudden possession of a few atomic weapons by the Congolese. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there is little reason to 
assume that the leadership of Sweden, Belgium, or Switzerland 
would be less responsible in issues of war and peace if these 
nations were to possess nuclear weapons. In the case of such 
nations as Egypt, it is not at all clear whether the possession 
of nuclear weapons would heighten the probability of nuclear con-
flict because of an expectation that the type of leadership 
characteristic of such countries as Egypt would act imprudently 
and irresponsibly. 
On occasion, however, the term responsible has been employed 
to describe a certain kind of weapons system rather than--or in 
addition to--the policy governing the use of those weapons. Thus 
Albert Wohlstetter speaks of a nresponsible deterrentn as one 
that is protected from a first strike and that has successfully 
met the problems of corrunand and control.8 In this sense, respon-
sibility implies a weapons system that avoids automaticity of 
8. Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+l 
Country," Foreign Affairs (April, 1961) p o 362. Wohlstetter also 
uses the term responsible to indicate a defensive, as distinguished 
from an aggressive, policyo In this latter sense, he identifies 
responsibility with an ninterest in deterrence rather than in 
aggressionon It should be clear, however, that a nation may 
possess a nresponsible deterrentn and still pursue a policy that 
is very irresponsible--and aggressive. 
9 
response as well as decentralization of decision. Of course, 
such a weapons system affords no guarantee that the nation 
possessing it will act responsibly or prudently. But it does 
provide the most favorable circumstances for responsible 
behavior; i.e., it permits one to be prudent. The merit of this 
particular argument, then, is to emphasize that prudent behavior 
is in substantial measure dependent not simply upon will or 
intent, but upon the objective circumstances in which nations 
must act. To the extent that the smaller nations are unable to 
fashion a "responsible deterrent," in the meaning indicated 
above, the prudent or responsible use of nuclear weapons may 
become exceedingly difficult. And in this specific sense, though 
only in this sense, there is a justification for equating power 
with responsibility. 
THE nsTATISTICAL" ARGUMENT 
It is a very different matter to argue that the greater the 
number of nations--large and small--possessing nuclear weapons, 
the greater the chance that nuclear conflict may arise as a con-
sequence of irresponsible action. The question at issue here is 
not whether great powers are somehow more responsible than small 
powers but whether the danger of irresponsible behavior simply 
increases with an increase in the number of nations that have the 
capability--specifically, the nuclear capability--of behaving 
irresponsibly. The argument, then, is TTstatistical" in ~haracter. 
It simply asserts that since there is always a possibility that 
the leadership of a nation--any nation--may behave in an irre-
sponsible manner, the possib;Llity that nuclear conflict may arise 
through irresponsible behavi6r must increase as the number. of 
nations possessing nuclear weapons increases. 
The nstatistical" argument, discussed above in connection 
with the problem of irresponsible action, may of course be 
generalized by applying it to almost all of the possible ways by 
which nuclear conflict could ariseo ~ost writers, in discussing 
the Nth nation problem, have not drawn the full consequences from 
the statistical argument. Even Ikl~, who has sought more care-
fully than others to articulate the statistical theory, writes: 
TTAccording to the tstatistical theoryt the 
probability of a global thermonuclear war increases 
as the number of nuclear powers increases, because 
(a) the larger the number of these powers, the 
greater the probability that nuclear weapons will 
10 
be used in s ome conflict ( both because of more 
opportunities and a greater chance of irresponsi-
bility); and ( b ) if nuclear weapons are used in a 
conflict , the risk of its expanding into a global 
war is gr eater than if the conflict remained non-
nuclear • 1' 9 
But the "statistical theory" may be and perhaps should be 
put in even br oader terms . I t applies to the problem of acci-
dental war, as well as to the problem of war arising from mis -
calculation or the misinterpretation of an adversary's inten-
tions . It also applies to the danger of ''catalytic war . nlO In 
a word, almost any of the causes that might lead to nuclear 
conf lict - -whether a local nuclear conflict or a global thermo-
nuclear conflict--may be regarded as representing a statistical 
probability and therefore falling within the terms of the argu-
ment, as it is broadly ~onceived above .11 
Whether , and to what extent, the "statistical theory" is 
relevant to the Nth country problem cannot be determined in the 
abstract. If it is assumed that despite the spread of nuclear 
weapons nations will continue to behave in much the same way as 
they now behave, that they will manifest the same degree of pru-
dence or the lack thereof, that they will continue to have the 
same fears and the same aspirations , and that they will still be 
prone to miscalculate with about the same frequency as in the 
past - -in short, if it is assumed that all else remains the same 
1 
9 . Fred C. Ikle, "Nth Countries & Disarmament," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists ( December , 1960), p . 391. 
1 
lOo Ikle , for example , separates the "statistical theoryn 
from the "catalytic war theory,'' as do most other writers who 
discuss the Nth nation problem . But the "catalytic war theory,n 
to the extent that it merits serious consideration at all, is 
itself a statistical problem--at least in part . 
11 . Wohlstetter (Op . cit., p . 371 ) makes this point with 
respect to the heightened probability of war by "mistaken 
likely to result from nuclear diffusion. Thus: nEven if, with 
large-scale proliferation, each new nuclear power adopted a 
positive control system with a high standard of responsibility, 
there would be an increase in the possibility of mistakes, 
simply because there would be more control centers.," 
11 
as before save that more and more nations have acquired nuclear 
weapons , then the case for the statistical theory seems very 
strong indeed . To accept this assumption, however, is to avoid 
or to beg most of the specific problems that are raised by 
nuclear diffusion . It must be expected that with the spread of 
nuclear weapons new forces and new pressures will become opera-
t ive . If these forces should tend , on balance, to increase insta-
bility , then the increased possibility of conflict--whether local 
or global--is not merely the result of the nstatistical theorytt 
but of these novel forces as well . If , on the other hand, the 
forces set in operation by the spread of nuclear weapons tend, on 
balance , to increase stability , then despite the nstatistical 
theoryn the possibility of nuclear conf lict--whether regional or 
gl obal--might diminish or at least not increase . A meaningful 
judgment on the significance of the statistical theory to the Nth 
country problem cannot be made without a more detailed examina-
tion of the specific problems resulting from nuclear diffusion . 
At best , it can follow such an analysis and not precede - -or merely 
bypass -- ita 
12 
as before save that more and more nations have acquired nuclear 
weapons, then the case for the statistical theory seems very 
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or to beg most of the specif ic problems that are raised by 
nuclear diffusion. It must be expected that with the spread of 
nuclear weapons new forces and new pressures will become opera-
tive. If these forces should tend, on bal ance, to increase insta-
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THE RELATION OF NTH POWERS TO THE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS 
In examining the more specific discussions of the effects of 
nuclear diffusion , and the degree to which these effects may prove 
destabilizing, it is useful to distinguish the possible impact of 
diffusion on the relations of Nth powers towards each other and on 
the relations of Nth powers to the major nuclear powers . 12 
With respect to the relations of Nth powers to the major 
nuclear powers , it has been argued that nuclear diffusion must 
pr ove destabilizing for the reason that nations acquiring nuclear 
weapons either would actually be in a more independent position 
t han before or would at least feel that they enjoyed a greater 
degree of independence . According to this argument , nuclear 
diffusion may therefore be expected to have a disruptive effect on 
t he cohesiveness and unity of the major alliance systems - -particu-
l arly the Western alliance system . The smaller nations acquiring 
12 . Strictly speaking, the term "Nth powern suggests the last 
state to achieve nuclear weapons . I n the following discussion , 
however, the term is used--rather loosely- - to indicate any nation 
(Chi na and Germany excepted ) that might acquire nuclear weapons 
in the near future . The term therefore refers both to the smaller 
and to the middle powers . Obviously , China is a case apart and 
deserves separate consideration . Probably the same should be 
said f or Germany . But apart from these two special cases , not 
specifically dealt with in this paper , the distinctions that are 
drawn in the succeeding pages should be reasonably clear . 
13 
nuclear weapons will generally prove more difficult to control. 
In terms of the international system as a whole, nuclear diffusion 
will militate against bipolarity . 
It is worth noting that this argument cannot be dismissed 
simply by demonstrating that nations acquiring only a very modest 
nuclear capability will not in fact be less dependent upon the 
support and protection of a major nuclear ally in resisting the 
pressures of another major nuclear power. Even if this is true, 
nuclear diffusion may nevertheless prove politically destabilizing 
if those nations acquiring nuclear weapons insist upon believing 
that these weapons do give them a more independent position . Nor 
does it seem unlikely that a number of them would believe--at least 
for a time- - that even a token nuclear capability could have the 
effect of rendering them less vulnerable to the blandishments of 
a major nuclear power ( or its allies ). 
Among those who dismiss the argument that a nuclear arse~al 
wi l l in fact serve as a means for becoming independent- - or at 
least substantially more independent- - of big-power tutelage, 
Henry Kissinger writes : "A major nuclear power , confronted by an 
Nth country not backed by another major nuclear power, could 
always strike pre -emptively . Thus Nth countries would continue 
to be dependent on the support of a major nuclear power . By the 
same token, the danger in the proliferation of national nuclear 
establishments is that it may enable some Nth countries - -and par-
ticularly Communist China --to commit their more powerful allies 
to nuclear war . ''13 
Kissingerts argument is simply that in view of the nuclear 
f orce any Nth power (China excepted ) can be ·ceasonably expected 
t o have in the next decade or so , it could not expect to reduce 
significantly- -much less to elirninate --the retaliatory forces of 
a major nuclear power by a preventive or a pre-emptive strike . 
On the other hand, to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against 
a major nuclear power might well provoke the latter to a pre -
emptive strike, which would even more decisively seal the fate 
of the smaller power . In view of this, Kissinger concludes , 
nuclear weapons probably would not improve the strategic posi -
tion of the Nth country vis-a-vis the major nuclear power . What 
nuclear weapons might do is give Nth countries allied to a major 
nuclear power an added leverage by virtue of an ability t o commit 
13 . Henry Kissinger , The Necessity for Choice (1961 ) , p . 42 . 
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the major power to nuclear war. But even this "nuisance value" of 
nuclear weapons may boomerang against the smaller power, since 
a major power convinced of the unreliability of a smaller ally 
may seek, particularly at a critical moment, to dissociate itself 
from the actions of its ally. 
It will be apparent that the strength of this position 
largely depends on the nature of the weapons system that it is 
assumed Nth powers might possess. If, for example, the weapons 
a smaller power might acquire could easily be destroyed through 
a pre-emptive strike by a major power, or if the active air 
defenses of a major power could easily destroy the modest forces 
a smaller power might launch (whether pre-emptively or in retali-
ation), then clearly it would be folly for a smaller power to 
believe that its nuclear weapons gave it a greater degree of 
strategic independence and security.14 On the contrary, in 
relation to its great adversary it would, if anything, be less 
secure. For the very fact that it possesses some nuclear weapons 
would serve to make it a "legitimate" object of nuclear blackmail 
by a major power in a way that it is not a legitimate object so 
long as it does not possess any nuclear weapons.IS Nor does it 
14. Of course, it still may be argued that if almost any 
nuclear weapons give a nation a ~riggering capability, then the 
possession of such weapons would enhance its security. Although 
a great power could destroy the smaller country's forces by a 
pre-emptive attack it would refrain from doing so for fear of 
sparking a global thermonuclear war. Even more, a great power 
would--accordjng to this reasoning--presumably refrain from 
seriously threatening the smaller country for fear that such 
action would provoke a desperate reaction on its part, thus 
triggering a global thermonuclear war. For reasons indicated 
below, it seems doubtful that this reasoning is valid. 
15. Some readers may question this point. Yet experience to 
date would seem to bear it out. There is a very distinct liability 
incurred--politically and propaganda wise--in threatening nuclear 
action against a nation that does not possess nuclear weapons which 
is not incurred in nearly the same degree when the threat of 
nuclear action is directed against a nuclear power. The Soviets 
have not been unaware of this consideration, as may be seen in 
their reluctance to date to use nuclear blackmail against nations 
that neither possess nuclear weapons nor entertain the nuclear 
forces of an ally. 
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seem reasonable to assume that if the smaller power is allied to 
a major power the latter would somehow be more willing or even as 
willing as heretofore to counter the nuclear blackmail of the 
other major power. The very fact that the smaller power has 
acquired nuclear weapons may very likely reflect a desire to gain 
a greater measure of independence from its major ally. It is 
unreasonable to expect that in these circumstances the major ally 
will nevertheless extend even further--at least in terms of the 
potential risk--the commitment it made at a time when the minor 
ally did not possess any nuclear weapons and was more amenable to 
the control of its major partner. And if the smaller power indi-
cates in any way that it is unreliable and may act irresponsibly 
(ioe., irresponsibly from the point of view of the major power), 
the major power can be expected to cut down rather than to extend 
the scope of its commitmento 
Nor is this all. Given a nuclear weapons system that may be 
destroyed either by a pre-emptive strike or by the active defenses 
of a major power, there is little reason to assume that a major 
power intent on applying pressures -other than the threat of nuclear 
blackmail would be particularly deterred by the fact that the vic-
tim possessed such a forceol6 It is difficult to see how such a 
force could be employed to deter subversion and related measures. 
It is almost equally difficult to see how the possession of such 
a force could serve to deter an attack undertaken only by conven-
tional forces, or if the smaller power mistakenly believes that 
its nuclear weapons permit it to reduce its conventional forces, 
the danger of local aggression undertaken by conventional arms 
alone may even increase. 
160 The argument adopted here must be considered with care. 
The point is not that major powers will feel free to employ 
limited force because of a conviction that a limited use of force 
can be kept limited and will not prove destabilizing at the stra-
tegic level. It is simply that a very small and inadequate nuclear 
force will not of itself deter a major power from action that it 
would otherwise take; ioeo, take against a nation that did not 
possess such a force. Indeed, it is argued below that the posses-
sion of such a force might well encourage the major power to apply 
pressure on a smaller nation, if the effect of the latter's acqui-
sition of nuclear weapons is to make its major ally more cautious 
about getting committed to its defense. 
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To be sure, there remains the possibility that a major 
power otherwise intent on aggression might be wary of provoking 
a conventional conflict with a minor nuclear power allied to a 
major power for fear that a desperate reaction by the minor 
power in using its nuclear weapons might precipitate a thermo-
nuclear conflict with its principal ally. But against this pos-
sibility must be balanced the prospect that the major power 
allied to the potential victim will ·only be too we1i aware of 
this danger, and consequently, may be ready to dissociate i tself 
from the initial use of nuclear weapons by its smaller ally. The 
willingness of a major power to extend nuclear deterrence to 
allies is limited enough even when those allies do not possess 
nuclear weapons and cannot themselves provoke a nuclear conflict 
or transform a convent i onal conflict into a nuclear conflict. 
Finally, in the event of a thermonuclear conflict between the 
great powers, a minor nuclear power allied to one of the major 
powers must expect the worst. There is at least the possibility 
that if the ally possesses no nuclear weapons, i t may escape 
direct assault during a thermonuclear exchange of the mighty. 
But if it does possess such weapons, it can expect to be included 
in the exchange almost as a matter of course. 
In sum, with respect to an Nth power's relationships .to 
major nuclear powers, a very low-class apprenticeship in the 
nuclear club would seem to impose a number of liabilities and 
to confer almost no benefits. On the other hand, if it is 
assumed that the weapons systems Nth powers might eventually 
possess would be of such a nature as to enable some _portion of 
them to survive a pre-emptive strike by a major power, then the 
picture could change quite considerably. Let us assume that an 
Nth country, presently allied to the United States, were to pos-
sess a weapons system of such a nature that in the event of a 
pre-emptive attack by the Soviets, it would still be left with 
enough weapons to devastate several Soviet cities. To be sure, 
it can be argued that a capability of this kind might a l so pro-
vide a standing temptation to the Soviets to undertake a pre-
ventive or a pre-emptive strike. Still, this argument seems 
rather strained and farfetched. Apart f rQm a global thermonucl ear 
war, the Soviets would be tempted to undertake a pre-emptive stri ke 
only if they were convinced that the Nth power was preparing to do 
the sa11e. A strike "out of the blue" by the Nth power, f or what-
ever reason, is of course always possible. But surely it is an 
extremely remote possibility, since whatever damage i t might do 
to t he adversary it must expect complete destruction in t ur n . 
A somewhat more likely circumstance in which the Soviets might 
be tempted to undertake a pre-emptive strike would be in a 
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situation of very high tension, or even of conventional hostili-
ties, between the Soviets--or a Soviet ally--and the Nth country. 
Even in this situation, however, the probability that the Nth 
country would attempt a pre-emptive strike, thereby insuring its 
own annihilation, would seem rather small, and the Soviets may be 
expected to realize this. Of course, if the Nth country were 
placed in a clearly desperate situation of having to choose 
between complete surrender and occupation, on the one hand, and 
undertaking a pre-emptive strike, on the other hand, it might 
choose the latter alternative, even though it would involve the 
nation's physical annihilation. Here again, though, a major 
adversary would surely be aware of this danger and would pre-
sumably take care to avoid deliberately placing the enemy in so 
desperate a plight. And it would avoid doing so not only because 
of the possibility that the Nth country's major ally might inter-
vene. This last danger would seem appreciably greater, given a 
substantial nuclear capability of an Nth power. The very fact 
that the latter is able to provoke a significant nuclear exchange 
with its adversary heightens the danger that the Nth powerts 
major ally will eventually be drawn in. And this is only to say 
that the ability of an Nth power to commit its more powerful ally 
to nuclear war i s probably roughly pr·oportionate to the nuclear 
strength of the Nth power.17 
The above remarks suggest the conclusion that, in relation to 
the major nuclear powers, the degree of strategic independence and 
of security an Nth power might possess would depend upon its 
power to inf lict damage upon a major adversary--particularly its 
second-strike capability. To this extent, Kissinger's previously 
noted argument partly misses the point. Of course, "a major 
nuclear power, confronted by an Nth power not backed by another 
major nuclear power, could always strike pre-emptively.n But 
against an Nth power capable of devastating in a second strike 
several cities of the major power, there will be very little 
17. There is the further consideration that the recipient of 
the Nth power attack might fear--and perhaps with good reason--that 
its major adversary that has until now stood aside might find this 
moment opportune for launching a preventive strike, and in order to 
prevent this, might launch what it considers to be a pre-emptive 
strike. Then, too, the major ally that has so far remained inactive 
will not be unaware of the fear entertained by its opponent and may 
thus be tempted to launch what it considers to be no more than a 
pre-emptive strike. 
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temptation even to threaten pre-emptiono Nor is it true to say 
that the Nth country would continue to be as dependent on the 
support of its major nuclear ally, for the Nth power's depend-
ence on its major ally is obviously no more than a function of 
the pressures brought against it and the consequent insecurity 
it experiences. Given a diminution of those pressures, the 
dependence of the Nth power is also bound to decrease. 
Thus, a certain type of nuclear arsenal under national con-
trol is likely to serve as a means for becoming much more inde-
pendent of big-power tutelage. Even more, if it is true that 
the ability of an Nth power to commit a major ally to nuclear 
war is roughly proportional to the nuclear strength of the Nth 
power, we have the rather paradoxical result that the greater 
the nuclear capability of an Nth country ally, the better are its 
chances to weather successfully the "crisis of extended deter-
rence" during a period in which the increasing invulnerability 
of the strategic forces of the major nuclear powers will cause 
them to be increasingly reluctant to extend nuclear deterrence 
to their allies. And if this reasoning is at all sound, Nth 
powers--and particularly the larger among them--will have a 
powerful incentive to acquire as effective a nuclear weapons 
system as their capabilities permit. 
Viewing nuclear capability as a sliding scale, then, 
there is a point below which the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
would not strengthen an Nth country's strategic independence and 
security in relation to the major nuclear powers. If anything, 
a nuclear capability falling short of this point would have the 
opposite effect. Above this point, however, nuclear weapons 
would give substantially greater independence and security and 
would continue to do so in ever greater degree as one moved 
still further up the scale. The chief difficulty, of course, 
is in identifying the dividing point on the scale with some 
degree of precision. Here, it is suggested that this point is 
reached when an Nth power has forces capable of surviving a first 
strike in sufficient measure to retaliate by striking at several 
cities of the major power. 
There remains the possibility, urged by some writers, that 
small powers might desire to acquire a force of low-yield nuclear 
weapons in the hope that this might deter a great power from 
employing tactical nuclear weapons should it ever resort to force 
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in the region of such minor po~rs.18 It is clear, however, that 
effective deterrence in this instance would necessarily depend 
upon the possession by the minorpower, or powers, of a rather sub-
stantial supply of tactical nuclear weapons. But from the point 
of view of the small power, what purpose would be served by the 
possession of such weapons? As long as a major power can achieve 
its ends without introducing tactical nuclear weapons, it will be 
to its interest to refrain from crossing the nuclear threshhold. 
These weapons cannot serve as an effective deterrent either to a 
conventional attack or to a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Against 
a conventional attack their initiation in the area of the small 
country might only serve to insure its annihilation. The major 
power is therefore not likely to be effectively deterred fran 
employing its conventional forces, since it will be aware of the 
reluctance of the small country to introduce the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons save in the last extremity. Against a pre-emptive 
nuclear strike tactical nuclear weapons are no deterrent, since 
they are intended for use on the battlefield and therefore pre-
sumably cannot be employed to strike at the cities of a ~ajor 
power. Nor would they seem as effective as the weapons systems 
considered earlier in raising the possibility that their employ-
ment would provoke a global thermonuclear war. And it is upon 
this possibility, it should once again be emphasized, that the 
deterrent value of Nth power nuclear forces in relation to the 
great powers will largely rest. 
18. See, for example, the discussion of Arthur Lee Burns, 
Two Essays on Deter·rence, Tempo (December, 1960), Part I. 11Sta-
bility Problems of Strategic Deterrent Systems." Burns suggests 
(p. 6) that "a number of small atomic powers--a 'junior nuclear 
club'--might deter great nuclear powers from using tactical 
nuclear force in regions populated by 'junior club' members." 
A commitment of this kind, however, presupposes a very high 
degree of political unity. And even if it could deter the intro-
duction of tactical nuclear weapons, could it provide effective 
deterrence against anything else (i.e., the use of conventional 




THE PROBLEM OF "CATALYTIC WAR" 
The problem of "catalytic war" does not so much involve the 
relations of Nth powers to the major nuclear powers as it does the 
possible impact of Nth powers on the mutual relations of the major 
nuclear powerso In brie f , the ncatalytic war" theory holds that 
an Nth country might deliberately precipitate or catalyze a war 
between the major nuclear powers "through the simulation of an 
attack by one of the major powers against the other.nl9 Once a 
rather fashionable theory, the danger of catalytic war (or at 
least t h is particular "catalytic war 11 theory) is now largely dis-
counted by analysts of the Nth nation problem. In order for a 
catalytic war strategy, as defined above, to hold out the promise 
of success, it is of course essential that the source of the 
attack remain obscure, not only to the attacked nation but to its 
major opponent as well. (The latter nation must in any event be 
expected immediately to disavow responsiblity for the attack.) 
Even if the source of the attack should remain obscure, however, 
the scope of the attack would have to be quite considerable in 
order to persuade the attacked nation that its major adversary 
had launched a preventive strike. It may be doubted whether many 
Nth countries will possess the forces required to persuade the 
attacked nation of this. There is, to be sure, always the possi-
bility that the attacked nation will react almost instantaneously 
, 
19. Ikle (op. cit., p. 392) has discussed various weaknesses 
of this theory. 
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and without waiting either to ascertain the scope of the attack 
or to determine its source. Whether it would so behave must 
depend very largely upon the degree to which its strategic forces 
are invulnerable. If these forces are relatively invulnerable 
and if the reaction time of the major power's command and control 
system can provide for such contingencies, it does not seem 
likely that it would respond to a catalytic war strategy by 
immediately attacking its major nuclear opponent.20 
In view of the risks a catalytic war strategy would entail 
for an Nth power, it is difficult to see what motives could prompt 
it to embark on such a hazardous course of actiono There is 
always the risk that it might fail to provoke a thermonuclear 
exchange between the great powers. If it does fail to achieve 
this result, the chances are good that it will be found out and 
subjected to the expected consequenceso And even if it did suc-
ceed in provoking a thermonuclear war between the great powers, 
it might not survive this conflict. Indeed, there is strong 
reason to believe that it would not survive. Although the 
attacked nation might not know the real source of the initial 
strike, it would presumably know that the Nth power does possess 
nuclear weapons. Such possession is itself sufficient reason to 
attack the Nth power once the major powers have come to gripso 
The idea that an Nth power might nevertheless accept these risks 
in order to achieve some vital interest (e.g., national unifica-
tion) surely cannot simply be dismissed out of hand. Even so, it 
appears rather strained and unlikely. 
Quite different from the catalytic war theory discussed above 
is the argument that an Nth country engaged in a conventional con-
flict in which it is steadily losing, might in desperation launch 
a nuclear strike either against a major-power adversary or an ally 
of the major power and thereby provoke a global thermonuclear war. 
In this instance, some writers prefer to speak of nuclear conflict 
through "escalation" rather than "catalysis." Both descriptions 
are correct. The conflict has escalated into an all-out nuclear 
20. If, on the other hand, the strategic forces of the major 
powers were to remain highly vulnerable and geared to a very close 
reaction time, the danger of catalytic war might be a serious one. 
The attacked nation might well feel that it had no choice but to 
respond immediately by attacking its major adversary. Then, too, 
there is the added danger that the other major power might feel 
compelled to initiate a pre-emptive strike precisely for the 
reason that it could not take the risk of waiting to see how the 
attacked nation would respond. 
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exchange. At the same time, the decisive element in this esca-
lating process may be the action of the Nth power, in which case 
it plays the role of catalytic agent in the process.21 
The differences between a catalytic war of this latter type 
and a catalytic war of the former type are fairly clear. Whereas 
in the former type the entire rationale of the action hinges on 
not being found out, in the latter type there is no question 
about the source of the initial nuclear strike. The circumstances 
in which either type might occur, therefore, are quite different. 
In the one, the ideal circumstance is a period of high tension in 
the relations between the major powers, though not involving--at 
least not directly involving--the Nth power. In the other, the 
most likely circumstance is that of an armed conflict of a con-
ventional character (it might also take the form of a civil war) 
in which the Nth power is steadily losing out (either to a major 
power directly or, more likely, to an ally of the major power). 
The hope informing the one type is that the Nth power might some-
how turn the trick and provoke an exchange between the giants 
while itself remaining relatively unscathedo The desperation 
in forming the other type is manifested by an act which is taken 
with an awareness that its conseqJence will very probably entail 
annihilationo If the latter type of catalytic war holds out a 
hope to an Nth power, it cannot be fulfilled by the catalytic 
action itself, but if at all, only by the effectiveness of the 
threat to take such action, which is in turn a function of the 
probability that the action if once taken would in fact provoke 
a global thermonuclear war. 
The essential problem raised by the latter type of catalytic 
war theory therefore concerns the relationship that might be 
expected between local wars involving at least one Nth power and 
the risk of global war arising from such local conflicts. In part, 
the answer to this problem m~st depend on the frequency with which 
local conflicts involving Nth powers might be expected to occur. 
21. Herman Kahn comes close to the point of view adopted above 
when he writes: "One may wish to broaden the definition of cata-
lytic war. Any method by which a nation uses military or diplomatic 
power to embroil larger nations or increase the scope of the con-
flict could be called catalytic.n Op. cit., p. 764. For all 
practical purposes, this may be interpreted to mean raising the 
level and scope of violence; i.e., what most writers have called 
"escalation.n 
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The impact of the spread of nuclear weapons on the relations of 
Nth powers, and the incidence of local conflicts, will be con -
sidered in the following section. Here it is sufficient to note 
that the principal conclusion suggested in the following section 
is that the impact of the spread of nuclear weapons on the rela-
tions of Nth powers to each other, and to nations not yet in 
posse~sion of nu2lear weapons , is very likely to be severely 
destabilizing . Hence, the prospects are that nuclear diffusion 
will be attended by an increase in the number of local conflicts . 
It is further suggested that along with an increase in the number 
of 102al conflicts will go an increase in the possibility of major -
power involvement . In part, the answer to the problem posed above 
has already been suggested in the preceding section . There it was 
pointed out that, although any resort to force directly or indi -
rectly involving a major power is likely to prove destabilizing 
at the strategic level, the degree to which the initiation of 
nuclear weapons by an Nth power in a local conflict would prove 
destabilizing at the strategic level depends very largely upon 
the size and quality of the nuclear forces· at the disposal of 
the Nth power . 
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CHAPI'ER V 
THE RELATION OF NTH COUNTRIES TO EACH OTHER 
The effect of the spread of nuclear weapons on the 
relations of Nth countries to each other would appear to 
be as follows . Assuming that nuclear diffusion occurs in 
a very uneven manner, and the chances are that this will be 
the case, a number of the nations acquiring nuclear weapons 
may be expected to use their newly gained advantage to resolve 
any serious conflicts of interest in their favor. The impetus 
to do so will be particularly strong if it is apparent that 
this advantage is only very temporary . Nor will it be neces -
sary in a substantial number of cases to possess anything but 
the most modest of weapons systems, for there are many small 
countries which are for all practical purposes identified with 
their capitals . To destroy the capital is in effect to destroy 
the nation . 
Even though it is almost precluded that nuclear diffusion 
will generally proceed in a symmetrical fashion, it is possible 
that two rival Nth nations might acquire nuclear weapons at 
approximately the same capabilities . In this case, some writers 
believe that extreme instability will stem from a different 
reason; i . e . , the very destructiveness of nuclear weapons . Thus 
Henry Kissinger has written : "None of the smaller countries will 
have the resources to create much more than a rudimentary first-
strike force . The elabbrate combination of warning, hardening, 
and mobility needed to survive a surprise attack seems beyond 
their capability •••• in order to safeguard their hard - won nuclear 
25 
capabilities, Nth countries will find themselves under nearly 
irresistible pressure to launch a surprise attack.n22 
This is perhaps too simple though. Some Nth countries will 
be able to create relatively invulnerable forces in relation to 
the kind of attack that could be made by another Nth country. 
Besides, if we assume symmetry in the nuclear c&pabilities of two 
Nth countries, the nation unde~taking the surprise attack may--
and probabl y woul d--have to choose between destroying the nuclear 
forces of the adversary or destroying his cities. The former 
alt ernative might require it to expend all its forces, and then 
with no certainty of complete success, whereas the latter alterna-
t ive would obviousl y leave it exposed to certain retaliation. To 
make t hese qualifications is not to deny that a symmetrical spread 
of nuclear weapons would give rise to considerable instability 
between Nth powers and that this instability would stem primarily 
from a mutual fear of surprise attack. It is only to point out 
that the .inst abilit y resulting from a fear of surprise attack, 
and consequently the pressure to launch a surprise attack, would 
probably not prove quite as great as commonly supposed because of 
the inhibitions that may be expected to operate on Nth countries. 
Aft er all, unless it is assumed that America is quite unique in 
her virtue and the Soviet Union quite unique in her prudence, we 
already have a historical model of sorts that might be applied--
with appropriate modifications, of course--to at least some of 
the Nth countries. 
Even so, the position that as among Nth countries generally 
the spread of nuclear weapons will give rise to increased insta-
bility, and a greater prospect not only of conflict but of nuclear 
conflict, does appear very persuasive. And if conflicts among Nth 
countries are more likely, it seems plausible to conclude that 
this consequence will have a destabilizing effect on the strategic 
relationship of the major powers, thus increasing the possibility 
of central thermonuclear war over what it would otherwise be in 
the absence of nuclear diffusion. The significance of the quali-
fication should be apparent. It may well be--and probably is--
true that if the major powers eventually acquire highly invul-
nerable forces and largely resolve the other problems on which 
strategic stability is dependent, the spread of nuclear weapons 
will not create an environment characterized by less strategic 
stability than we possess today. This is only to say that the 
destabilizing effects of nuclear diffusion at the strategic level 
will probably not outweigh the stabilizing effects of the measures 
the major powers are presently taking. Hence a future world in 
22. Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 244-45. 
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which there are many nuclear powers may still be a more stable 
world in terms of the prospects of global thermonuclear war 
than is the present world. But it is also likely to be a much 
less stable world than it would otherwise be if nuclear diffusion 
could somehow be prevented. 
The above corrunents may be questioned, however, on the ground 
that they simply assume the likelihood of major power involvement 
in local conflicts. But even if it is granted that nuclear dif-
fision will create circumstances more conducive to local conflict 
it still does not follow that the major powers will necessarily 
be involved in these conflicts. On the contrary, it has been 
argued that "the diffusion of nuclear capabilities might make the 
involvement of major powers in local conflicts appear to be more 
risky and hence render it less likely.n23 
In reply to this argument, the following points may be made. 
A clear separation must be drawn between the likelihood of local 
conflicts initiated or instigated by a major power against an Nth 
country and the likelihood of local conflicts between Nth countries 
which occur independently of and perhaps even in spite of the wishes 
of the major powers. It is not necessary to contend that the inci-
dence of the former type of local conflict will probably increase 
in a period of nuclear diffusion. It is possible that this type 
of conflict will even become less likely, though it is difficult 
to make out a very persuasive case in support of this conclusion. 
At any rate, the critical point here is whether there will be an 
increased prospect for conflicts of the latter type and whether 
the factors operating to impel eventual major power involvement 
in conflicts between Nth powers will be as strong as are the forces 
operating today to involve major power involvement in local conflicts. 
The position that nuclear diffusion will increase the prospects for 
independent local conflicts seems difficult to deny. As for the 
likelihood of major power involvement in local conflicts, it seems 
doubtful that this likelihood will be substantially affected in the 
majority of instances by the possibility that nuclear weapons may 
be employed by the parties immediately involved. This likelihood 
arises not so much from the weapons employed (and particularly if 
the Nth powers involved have a very modest nuclear force) as it 
23. Ikle, op. cit., p. 391. And Ikle adds: "In other words, 
Nth country capabilities might eigher help to deter local agres-
sion altogether or they might help to isolate local conflicts.n 
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does from the more basic structural characteristics of the 
Cold War and the seeming inability of the major powers to 
refrain from eventually involving themselves in local 
conflicts . 24 
24. Even if it were to be conceded that nuclear diffusion 
would operate to decrease the likelihood of major power involvement 
in local conflicts, this diminished likelihood would still have to 
be weighed against the prospect of increased conflict among the 
Nth powers. Unless it can be shown that very compelling considera-
tions would militate against major power involvement in Nth country 
conflicts, it would seem that the more reasonable conclusion is 
that an increase in the prospects for local conflicts will carry 
with i t the expectation of major power involvement in at least 
some of these conflicts. In a word, the nstatistical theory" 
appears more persuasive here than the argument which is based on 




First: It is likely that nuclear diffusion will prove 
destabilizing if for no other reason than it will present us 
with a novel world, and a world which is, on the ~hole, sub-
stantially less secure than the present world. The acquisition 
of nuclear weapons, it is true, may be expected to have a sober-
ing effect upon nations. Nevertheless, any increase of prudence 
may be more than offset by the actual insecurity many nations 
will experience. 
Second: In relation to the major powers, the position of 
Nth countries will largely depend upon the nature and quality of 
the weapons systems they are able to acquire. Those nations pos-
sessing a weapons system that can be entirely destroyed by a pre-
emptive strike, or that can be readily destroyed by the active 
defenses of a major power, would probably not enjoy a greater 
degree of strategic independence and security. If anything they 
are likely to be less secure in relation to a major power intent 
on applying pressure ranging from subversion to the employment of 
conventional forces. 
On the other hand, an Nth country may well become considerably 
more independent if it possesses a weapons system some small portion 
of which could survive a pre-emptive strike by a major power--enough, 
let us say, to destroy at least several cities of the major power. 
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This result follows not only from the reluctance of a major 
power to incur the risk of losing several cities by pushing 
an Nth power too far, but also from the fear that during such 
an exchange with an Nth country its major adversary--particularly 
if it is allied to the Nth country--may be tempted to strike or 
even feel compelled to strike. The "trigger" value of nuclear 
weapons for an Nth country will of course depend on the size of 
the trigger. Below a certain size the trigger may well prove to 
be a liability rather than an asset, both in relation to a major 
adversary as well as in relation to a major ally. But above a 
certain size and quality, the trigger may turn into an asset of 
considerable significance. 
Finally, in relation to major powers, it is difficult to 
see the advantage an Nth power would obtain by acquiring tactical 
nuclear weapons, assuming that the area in which such weapons were 
to be employed would in all probability be restricted to the terri-
tory of the Nth country. 
Third: Whether nuclear diffusion raises the danger of so-
called "catalytic war" depends, in the first place, on what one 
has in mind when using the term. In one sense, the term has been 
used to describe a situation in which an Nth power might deliber-
ately precipitate a thermonuclear exchange between the major 
powers by the simulation of an attack by one of these powers 
against the other. The reality of this danger arising from 
nuclear diffusion is increasingly discounted and, for reasons 
elaborated in earlier pages, it is believed rightly so. In 
another sense, however, the term catalytic war may be used to 
describe a situation in which an Nth country, finding itself in 
a desperate plight, deliberately strikes at a major nuclear power 
and thereby precipitates a global thermonuclear war (though, once 
again, the prospect that such a strike might lead to a central 
thermonuclear war will depend in large measure on the size and 
quality of the nuclear forces of the Nth country). Since this 
danger would probably be greatest in a situation of armed con-
flict involving the Nth country, most writers prefer to speak of 
nuclear conflict through "escalation" rather than through 
"catalysis." While both of these descriptive terms are correct, 
if the decisive element in this escalating process is the action 
of the Nth country in initiating the use of nuclear weapons, it 
has served the role of a catalytic agent in provoking thermo-
nuclear conflict. 
An estimate of the effect nuclear diffusion may have on the 
prospects for catalytic war in this latter sense of the term 
depends not only on the expected frequency of local conflicts 
involving Nth countries, but also on the likelihood that such 
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conflicts may turn into global thermonuclear war . The position 
taken here is that nuclea~ diffusion will increase the likeli -
hood of local conflicts among Nth countries and that the possi-
bility of major power involvement in such conflicts is likely 
to remain about the same as is the possibility of major power 
involvement today in local conflicts . If such conflicts as 
occur between Nth countries can be effectively contained and 
prevented from developing into a global war, it will not be 
due--at least not primarily--to the noninvolvement of major 
powers (out of fear that involvement in Nth country conflicts 
has become too risky) but to the progress the major powers have 
made in creating invulnerable forces and in resolving the prob-
lems of command and control over these forces . Even so , nuclear 
diffusion will have a strategically destabilizing effect pri -
marily because it will increase the likelihood of military 
instability at the less than strategic level and this insta-
bility, it is believed, must eventually have an effect at the 
strategic level . 
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